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Abstract
A membership inference attack (MIA) against a machine learning model enables an attacker
to determine whether a given data record was part of the model’s training data or not. The
eectiveness of these attacks is reported using metrics computed across the whole population
(e.g., average attack accuracy). In this paper, we show that the attack success varies across
dierent subgroups of the data (e.g., race, gender), i.e., there is disparate vulnerability. Even if
MIA’s success looks no better than random guessing over the whole population, subgroups can
still be vulnerable. We study the necessary and sucient conditions for a classier to exhibit
disparate vulnerability, and we determine to what extent certain learning techniques (e.g., fairness
constraints, dierential privacy) can prevent it. Our work provides a theoretical framework for
studying MIA attacks from a new perspective.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are vulnerable to Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs). In these attacks,
an adversary infers whether an example was part of the training dataset by using the outputs
of the model. These attacks are particularly threatening when a model operates on sensitive
domains [16, 21, 23]. Shokri et al. [28] observed that the attack’s performance can dier across
target classes, and later Long et al. [20] showed that MIAs can be successful against some individuals
even if models are well-generalized. In this paper, we systematically analyze the phenomenon of
disparate vulnerability: the fact that certain population subgroups are more vulnerable to MIAs than
others. Typically, MIAs are evaluated through average success across examples in a dataset [22, 28].
Disparate vulnerability means that this can lead to overestimation of privacy for some individuals.
We develop a theoretical framework to model subgroup-based vulnerability to MIAs, applicable
to any classier. We show that vulnerability is caused by dierences in model’s behaviour on
the training dataset and outside (more general than overtting), and the main factors for its
disparity are the size and the distribution of subgroups. As a result, disparate vulnerability mostly
aects minorities who are less represented in the data. We show that this problem persists even
if models are trained with fairness constraints (producing equal performance for all subgroups),
and dierential privacy (hiding the presence of individual examples in the training set), unless we
sacrice the accuracy of the classier. These results complement the ndings by Bagdasaryan et al.
[4] and Pujol et al. [25] in terms of understanding the disparate impact on subgroups when using
dierentially-private models.
2 Membership Inference Attacks
Let Ω be a population of labeled examples, where each example (x, y) ∈ Ω represents an individual
with x being a feature vector and y ∈ Y = {1, . . . , p} being a label. We assume that the population
is partitioned in disjoint subgroups formed by examples with a given attribute, e.g., race or gender
the way they are commonly codied in data: Gz ⊂ Ω for z ∈ Z = {1, . . . , k}, with
⋃
Gz = Ω.
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We consider a classication setting in which a classier takes as input a feature vector x, and
returns a condence prediction over the labels: f(x) 7→ [0, 1]p. We train f(x) on the training
dataset S sampled from the population Ω according to an unknown distribution. We denote as
M(X,Y ) , 1[(X,Y ) ∈ S] the random variable indicating whether an example (X,Y ) belongs
to S, where 1 is the indicator function. We let Z(X,Y ) be the random variable indicating the
subgroup to which (X,Y ) belongs. We omit the arguments and useM and Z if no ambiguity arises.
Finally, we let Yˆ = f(X) be the random variable corresponding to classier outputs.
MIA Formalization. The goal of a MIA is to predict whether an example (x, y) ∈ Ω is a member
or a non-member of the training set of a target classier f(x) (classier when no ambiguity arises).
The attack works as follows: given (x, y), the adversary queries the classier with x to obtain a
condence prediction yˆ = f(x). Based on yˆ and information about (x, y), the adversary attempts
to predict whether (x, y) was in the training dataset or not. Similarly to previous works [28, 30],
we assume that the example (x, y) given to the adversary is equally likely to be a member or a
non-member:
Assumption 1. Pr[M(X,Y ) = 0] = Pr[M(X,Y ) = 1] = 12 .
This corresponds to the adversary not having any prior knowledge on the membership of
examples in the training set. Hence, the distribution of examples given to the adversary (X,Y ) is
not the data distribution; instead, (X,Y ) are uniformly sampled either from S or Ω \ S with 1/2
probability.
The success of the MIA adversary A is a measure of vulnerability of the target classier to MIA:
Denition 1. We call MIA vulnerability the expected accuracy of the adversary A:
V A , E
[
1[A = M(X,Y )] = Pr[A = M(X,Y )]]. (1)
whereA represents the adversary’s prediction. Because our analysis focuses on the vulnerability
for each population subgroup, we also dene the success of adversary A against a subgroup z:
Denition 2. Let z ∈ Z be a subgroup of the population. We dene the subgroup vulnerability:
V Az , E
[
1[A = M(X,Y )] | (X,Y ) ∈ Gz
]
Adversary model. We consider a regular adversary (AR) and a discriminating adversary (AD). The
former is the standard MIA adversary [28], who uses only the true label y and the output of the
classier yˆ to predict the membership. We denote the vulnerability against this adversary as V R.
The latter addresses the fact that an adversary can have additional information about the target
example. We assume this knowledge is the subgroup z to which the example belongs (e.g., if the
subgroup is a part of the feature vector x). Using this information gives the discriminating adversary
an advantage over the regular adversary (See Proposition 1). We denote the vulnerability against
this adversary as V D. When measuring V D we assume that M is jointly independent from Y and
Z to avoid capturing the eect of sampling bias in the training dataset:
Assumption 2. M⊥(Y,Z) .
Violating any of our two assumptions can only increase vulnerability. If the adversary has
additional prior knowledge (violating Assumption 1), the adversary’s success can increase arbitrarily.
If the adversary gets additional information on sampling bias of the dataset (violating Assumption 2),
the adversary’s success also increases. Therefore, relaxing these assumptions would only result in
stronger evidence of disparate vulnerability, at the cost of increasing the analysis complexity.
Adversaries’ optimality. In our analysis, we use optimal instances for both adversaries in order
to give worst-case security guarantees. We assume these Bayes adversaries have perfect knowledge
of the underlying probability distributions and can thus use Bayes-optimal classiers [8, 26]:
AR(y, yˆ) , arg max
m∈{0,1}
Pr[m | y, yˆ], AD(y, yˆ, z) , arg max
m∈{0,1}
Pr[m | y, yˆ, z] . (2)
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Figure 1: Statistical evidence of disparate vulnerability to the discriminating attacker. Each cell
represents a pair of two subgroups (see Section A.2 for the subgroup-names key). “1” means there
is evidence of disparate vulnerability between two subgroups, with signicance level 0.005, “0”
means no sucient evidence.
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Figure 2: Subgroup vulnerability to discriminating and regular attacker. The distributions are over
35 dierent models trained on dierent train/test shues.
Because adding information cannot decrease the performance of a Bayes-optimal classier, the
success of the discriminating adversary is at least as high as that of the regular one:
Proposition 1. V D ≥ V R .
The proof for this, and all the other formal statements in the rest of the paper, are in Appendix B.
3 Disparate Vulnerability
In this section, we introduce the measure of disparate vulnerability, experimental methods for
estimating it, and present the rst set of experimental results.
Denition 3. Disparity in vulnerability (disparity, for short) is the dierence in vulnerability
between two subgroups z 6= z′: ∆Vz,z′ , |Vz − Vz′ | .
To estimate vulnerability and its disparity in practice, we follow a procedure similar to the
standard method by Chatzikokolakis et al. [6]. We plug in frequency-based estimates of Pr[M | Y, Yˆ ]
and Pr[M | Y, Yˆ , Z] into Equations (1) and (2), respectively. To obtain these estimates, we sample
examples (x, y) with probability 1/2 from the model’s training set S or from a hold-out set S¯ ⊂ Ω\S.
We query the classier with these examples and obtain the outputs yˆ = f(x), which we discretize
to be able to estimate the frequencies. As for the sets S and S¯, we sample them such that they
are equal-size and are stratied by (y, z), in order to satisfy Assumption 1 and 2. We denote the
vulnerability and disparity estimates as Vˆz and ∆Vˆz,z′ . (More details in Section A.1.)
Datasets. We use three datasets: ADULT, based on the 1994 US Census [17] with income labels
(more or less than $50K), COMPAS with recidivism labels from the ProPublica’s investigation [15],
and UTKFace [31], a set of face images annotated with age, gender and ethnicity of the individuals.
We discretize the UTKFace age attribute into 6 classes and use as labels for age classication. We
employ standard data cleaning and pre-processing as detailed in Section A.2.
3
Models. We train and evaluate ML models with various architectures: logistic regression, single
hidden-layer neural networks, and deep neural networks. For ADULT and COMPAS, we use logistic
regression and a single-layer network with 6 hidden units. These classiers do not overt for
neither dataset, achieving 85% accuracy for ADULT and 68% for COMPAS. We train a convolutional
neural network on UTKFace for 100 epochs with dropout layers (Section A.3), obtaining 57%
test accuracy (vs. 40% baseline). We avoid evaluating the vulnerability of pre-trained models on
UTKFace, despite the potential gain in accuracy, because MIA is not well-dened for pre-trained
models.
Statistical evidence of disparate vulnerability. To make sure that disparate vulnerability is
not a random artifact, we train each model 35 times using stratied random shues of training
and test sets (S and S¯), and evaluate the vulnerability of each model. For every example in a
shue we record a) whether the adversary has been correct in their inference, 1(A = M), and
b) the example’s subgroup. Thus, we have measurements of vulnerability with a between-subject
subgroup variable—many examples (“subjects”) belong to the same subgroup,— and a within-subject
shue variable—the same example appears in all shues. Such setup is known as a mixed-design
experiment [3].
Because of this structure, our vulnerability measurements are not independent across shues
and we cannot use the most common test statistics to establish disparate vulnerability. We employ
the standard procedure for mixed-design setups: t a linear mixed-eects model, and run an ANOVA
test to tell whether vulnerability is signicantly correlated with the subgroup [12]. If the test is
conclusive, we conduct follow-up pairwise tests to identify particular subgroup pairs that exhibit
disparity. We use the signicance level of α = 0.005 with appropriate adjustments. This procedure
provides high statistical power even when subgroups are small (e.g., in COMPAS), and accounts
for the intra-shue and inter-shue dependencies in our measurement data. (More details in
Section A.4.)
Figure 1 shows the results of disparity tests. A “1” indicates evidence of disparate vulnerability.
The tests are inconclusive for the regular adversary, and against the well-generalized UTKFace
model. However, we nd clear evidence of disparity for the discriminating adversary on ADULT
and COMPAS.
Disparate vulnerability eect size. Knowing whether a classier exhibits disparate vulnerability
is uninformative of its eect size. Figure 2 shows the distribution of vulnerability values, aggregated
across shues. The overall vulnerability is close to the 1/2 baseline for most models, but we observe
that vulnerability varies across subgroups. We study the underlying reasons in Section 4.
Denition 4. Max-disparity is the maximum observed pairwise disparity among any two subgroups:
maxz 6=z′ ∆Vˆz,z′ . It is measured in percentage points. We drop its units if it is clear from the context.
We measure max-disparity within each shue, and then average across the shues. On
UTKFace, max-disparity of the non-overtting deep neural network is the lowest: 0.83 (0.34) p.p.
against the regular (discriminating) attacker. On ADULT, the logistic regression and the neural
network have a low max-disparity: 3.27 (5.07) and 3.22 (5.04). In COMPAS, the max-disparity is
much more pronounced, with 18.61 (29.03) and 15.93 (30.50), respectively. (See Appendix C for more
details.)
Takeaways. From these experiments we conclude that not being vulnerable to the regular adversary
should not be interpreted as the model being private: an adversary using subgroup information can
have better performance overall, and also on particular subgroups. More worryingly, subgroups with
small representation are consistently more vulnerable (see Figure 2). In contrast, a well-generalized
neural network trained on the relatively large UTKFace did not exhibit signicant disparate
vulnerability, despite being vulnerable to MIA on average (see Appendix C).
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Figure 3: Overtting eect on disparate vulnerability, discriminating adversary. Fig. 1 for plot
details.
4 Eects of Subgroup Learnability
We study how learnability inuences disparate vulnerability. In practice, two factors make certain
subgroups harder to learn than others: a) how much data is available for the subgroup, and
b) inherently, how hard is the subgroup’s distribution to learn. For our evaluation, we use the
UTKFace dataset, discarding the “Other” subgroup, which does not have enough examples for a
meaningful analysis. “Asian” becomes the least populous subgroup with 3,434 examples.
Subgroup data distribution. We investigate whether the data distribution of certain subgroups
makes them inherently more vulnerable to MIAs. In this experiment, at each step we take K
examples from each of m subgroups, train a model on mK examples and measure subgroup and
average overall vulnerability using mK train and mK test examples, satisfying Assumption 1).
Figure 4 (left) shows the result for the discriminating adversary with m = 4 subgroups and at
most K = 1717 training examples per subgroup. The eect for the regular adversary is similar
but less pronounced (Appendix C). The attacker performs similarly against “Indian”, “Asian”, and
“White” subgroups and quite dierently against “Black”. The increase in vulnerability fromK = 300
to 700 examples is likely due to an increase in the model capacity for learning new visual features.
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Figure 4: Vulnerability per subgroup for the dis-
criminating adversary (error bars are 95% CI),
when: i) each subgroup has the same amount of
data (left), showing the impact of the diculty
in learning each group’s distribution, ii) one sub-
group’s size (“Asian”) is increased (right) showing
how the amount of data per group aects dispar-
ity.
Subgroup data size. We measure how much
the size of a single subgroup inuences vul-
nerability. Intuitively, more examples improve
the classier generalization for the subgroup,
reducing its vulnerability. We measure the sub-
groups vulnerability as we increase the num-
ber of available examples for a single (target)
subgroup, keeping xed the size of the other
subgroups and sampling train and test datasets
respecting Assumption 1 and 2.
In Figure 4 (right), we consider the “Asian”
subgroup as target. We observe that when the
target subgroup is small, its vulnerability is
large. The vulnerability decreases rapidly as
the subgroup size increases, improving gener-
alization. Importantly, other subgroup vulner-
abilities do not change. The results are similar
for other subgroups (see Appendix C).
Takeaways. Our experiments show that a subgroup’s data distribution aects its vulnerability, even
if all subgroups were equally represented in the data. However, if the subgroup is less represented in
the data, it is more vulnerable. On the positive side, improving the representation of a subgroup
does not cause any privacy harm to others.
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5 Eects of Overtting
M = 0M = 1
yˆ
Pr[yˆ | y, m]
Figure 5: Distributional overtting. The curves
represent the distributions of a model’s outputs
on the training set (M = 1) and outside (M = 0)
for a class y. The striped area shows the amount
of distributional overtting τ(y): total variation
between model’s outputs on training and outside.
Overtting in the sense of a dierence between
the loss on the training and test sets, is consid-
ered an important factor for MIA [28]. We study
the eect of overtting on both vulnerability
and disparate vulnerability.
Standard overtting. We train two over-
parametrized single-layer neural networks for
ADULT and COMPAS datasets, one with 100
neurons and one with 500. These models use
ReLU activation, and are trained for 200 epochs
with the adam solver. For UTKFace, we use
the same neural network as above, but without
dropout. All these models signicantly overt.
We observe higher average vulnerability as compared to non-overtting models, and statistical
evidence of disparity for all datasets. Notably, on UTKFace overtting marginally increases
average vulnerability (1 p.p) with respect to the non-overtting model, but now there is statistical
evidence of disparity against both adversaries. In terms of eect size, in all datasets overtting
increases the max-disparity by 2–4 p.p. (Details in Appendix C.)
Distributional Subgroup Overtting. We showed experimentally that standard overtting
causes both vulnerability and disparate vulnerability. How can we reason about this systematically?
Recall that the regular adversary AR bases their decisions on the posterior distribution: Pr[M |
Yˆ , Y ]. Because Pr[M ] is uniform by Assumption 1, using Pr[Yˆ , Y |M ] instead will result in the
same decisions. Moreover, because Pr[Y |M ] = Pr[Y ] by Assumption 2 we have the equivalent
form:
AR(yˆ, y) , arg max
m∈{0,1}
Pr[m | y, yˆ] = arg max
m∈{0,1}
Pr[yˆ | y,m] .
In other words, to obtain the decisions, the adversary uses the dierence in the distributions of the
classier’s outputs yˆ between examples from the training dataset and outside of it.
Denition 5. We dene the distributional-overtting distance of a classier for class y, as the total
variation between the distributions of outputs of the model on the training and outside, given that
the ground truth class is y (See Figure 5):
τ(y) , 1
2
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
∣∣Pr[yˆ | y,M = 1]− Pr[yˆ | y,M = 0]∣∣ .
For subgroups, distributional overtting becomes:
Denition 6. We dene the subgroup distributional-overtting distance for a subgroup z and class
y as the total variation between distributions of outputs of the model on the training dataset and
outside, given that examples (x, y) ∈ Gz :
τz(y) ,
1
2
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
∣∣Pr[yˆ | y, z,M = 1]− Pr[yˆ | y, z,M = 0]∣∣ .
We also dene class-bias, the imbalance of classes across subgroups, as ρz(y) , Pr[y | z].
We can now show that vulnerability to both regular and discriminating adversaries depends on
the distributional overtting:
Theorem 1. The overall vulnerability values of the regular and discriminating adversaries are equal
to the following averages of distributional-overtting distances:
V R =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
Pr[y] τ(y), V D =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
z∈Z
Pr[z] ρz(y) τz(y) .
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As a consequence, the absence of standard overtting does not prevent vulnerability: a model
could have equal losses on the training and outside, and yet dierent output distributions.
Conditions for No Disparity.
Theorem 2 (Necessary and sucient condition for no disparity). Let z and z′ be two subgroups of
the population. There is no disparate vulnerability between the two subgroups for a discriminating
adversary (i.e., ∆V Dz,z′ = 0) i:∑
y∈Y
(
ρz(y) τz(y)− ρz′(y) τz′(y)
)
= 0 . (3)
The proof and equivalent necessary and sucient condition for the regular adversary are in
Section B.2. Based on Theorem 2, we observe the following sucient condition to remove disparate
vulnerability.
Corollary 1. Suppose a model does not overt in the distributional sense for all subgroups z and
for all classes y: τz(y) = 0. Then the model does not exhibit disparate vulnerability for any pair of
subgroups z and z′: ∆V Rz,z′ = ∆V
D
z,z′ = 0.
This condition prevents disparity against both adversaries: it ensures that the model’s output
has the same distribution on training and outside, for each subgroup.
Takeaways. We show a general result: without any parametric assumptions, and for any classier,
the vulnerability to the regular and discriminating adversaries exists if and only if the classier
exhibits distributional overtting. This generalizes and complements the results of Yeom et al. and
Sablayrolles et al.. Moreover, we show that disparate vulnerability arises if and only if distributional
overtting diers across subgroups. This gives a general guideline for privacy defences: ensure that
the model’s behavior is consistent on the training dataset and outside, across population subgroups.
6 Preventing Disparate Vulnerability
Unfortunately, the condition in Corollary 1 is hard to meet in practice. In this section, we evaluate
whether techniques to enhance privacy and to prevent disparate eects can be eective mitigations.
6.1 Dierential Privacy
First, we look at whether learning with dierential privacy [11] helps in preventing disparity.
Denition 7. The training algorithm train(S) of a classier satises ε-DP if for any two datasets
S, S′ diering by the records of one individual, for any set of classiers A:
Pr[train(S) ∈ A] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[train(S′) ∈ A] .
Dierential privacy (DP) limits the leakage of any individual record in the dataset and upper-
bounds the average vulnerability [10], and thus seems like a natural defence against MIAs.
Empirical Evaluation. To study how DP aects disparate vulnerability we train DP models with
dierent privacy levels. As a target model, we use DP logistic regression with private empirical risk
minimization [7], trained using the diprivlib [14] implementation. We use a min-max scaler, and
provide a maximum row norm equal to the square root of the number of features. We use privacy
levels ε = 1.0, 2.5, 5.0, 7.5. We run this experiment on COMPAS, our smallest dataset, and ADULT,
our largest dataset. All trained models beat the random accuracy baselines.
As with non-overtting models (Section 3), we do not observe disparity for the regular adversary.
For the discriminating adversary, we nd that the highest privacy level in our experiments (ε = 1)
substantially mitigates disparity, yet does not remove it completely. As ε increases, the number of
7
pairs exhibiting statistical disparity increases too, with results comparable to non-private models
when ε = 7.5 (see Appendix C for details). In terms of eect size, compared to the non-overtting
models in Section 3, we observe a signicant drop in max-disparity on COMPAS: from 29 (logistic
regression) to 12 (ε = 1) against the discriminating attacker, but only a small drop of 1 p.p. on
ADULT. At the same time, DP has a signicant impact on accuracy. The most private conguration
results in about 10 p.p. accuracy drop on both ADULT and COMPAS.
6.2 Algorithmic Fairness
A technique that intuitively should prevent disparate vulnerability is fairness-constrained learning.
Due to the dependency of disparate vulnerability on the disparate behavior of the model across
subgroups (Figure 5), minimizing the discrepancy in classier’s performance across population
subgroups [9] should also reduce disparate vulnerability.
We consider the equality of odds (EO) notion [13], which addresses dierence in distributions of
the values relevant to MIA adversaries: yˆ and y. A classier satises EO if the following holds for
any subgroups z and z′, and any yˆ, y: Pr[yˆ | y, z] = Pr[yˆ | y, z′], where probabilities are over the
data distribution.
Even if a classier theoretically satises EO, the equality might not hold on a nite data sample
S (i.e., Pr[yˆ | y, z,M = 1] 6= Pr[yˆ | y, z′,M = 1]). Thus, there can still be disparity due to a
possible dierence between τz(y) and τz′(y). To avoid this, we strengthen this fairness denition:
Denition 8 (Generalized Equality of Odds). For a given training dataset, the classier satises
generalized equality of odds (GEO) if the following holds for any subgroups z and z′, any yˆ, y, and
any m ∈ {0, 1}:
Pr[yˆ | y, z,m] = Pr[yˆ | y, z′,m]
Intuitively, this means that equality of odds holds both within the training dataset and outside.
This formalization implies that the EO property generalizes beyond the training data.
The rst implication of GEO is that a discriminating adversary has no advantage over a regular
one.
Proposition 2. Suppose a classier satises GEO. Then, V Rz = V Dz for any subgroup z.
Moreover, in the case that when no class bias exists in the data (i.e., class distributions are equal
across subgroups), GEO does completely prevent disparate vulnerability:
Proposition 3. Suppose a classier satises GEO, and ρz(y) = ρz′(y) holds for any y and for all z,
z′ (i.e., there is no class imbalance). Then, ∆V Rz,z′ = 0 and ∆V
D
z,z′ = 0.
However, if class bias exists, this strengthened notion of equality of odds is not sucient to
prevent disparate vulnerability.
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Figure 6: Disparity of a model
satisfying equality of odds on
ADULT. See Figure 1 for details.
Empirical evaluation. We use a logistic regression classi-
er, post-processed to satisfy vanilla EO, based on the fairlearn
library [2]. We evaluate it on the COMPAS and ADULT datasets.
Even though the theoretical results implying EO is not su-
cient to prevent disparity, in practice on ADULT EO decreases it
in both statistical sense (Figure 6), and in terms of max-disparity,
lowering it from 5 to 3 against the discriminating adversary. On
COMPAS, it lowers max-disparity from 30 to 17, but the disparity
is still statistically signicant. On the negative side, EO increases
the average vulnerability to the regular adversary and, on COM-
PAS, even introduces the disparity in the statistical sense. Thus,
EO makes regular and discriminating vulnerabilities closer (see
Proposition 2), but this happens at the cost of an increase of
regular vulnerability. (Details in Appendix C.)
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6.3 Takeaways
DP provides an upper bound on the vulnerability of all individuals. Because DP guarantees are
often at odds with accuracy, in practical applications ε is usually set high, allowing for a lot of
variation; we observe this variation in our experiments. As for models satisfying EO, they decrease
max-disparity, but still exhibit statistical evidence of disparity against both adversaries.
We observe that although DP and EO models can yield similar results in terms of statistical
evidence of disparity, they oer dierent trade-os in terms of max-disparity and model accuracy.
E.g., the ε = 2.5 DP model on COMPAS exhibits about 9 p.p. lower max-disparity than EO, but EO
model is 5 p.p. more accurate (See Appendix C.) On the downside, EO does not provide any means
to control the vulnerability-accuracy trade-o as DP does.
These results show that existing techniques, applied directly, cannot guarantee the absence
of disparate vulnerability. We conclude that designing a privacy defense with equal eect on all
individuals without a signicant penalty in accuracy needs additional investigation.
7 Conclusions
Our ndings reveal that Membership Inference Attacks can disparately target population subgroups.
We provide new insights into why and when membership inference is possible and why and when
these attacks have disparate impact. We demonstrate that current defenses do not provide equal
protection to all individuals represented in datasets, and we provide the community with a new set
of evaluation criteria to reason about the privacy of models.
Our results surface a more general problem of aggregate privacy measures with profound societal
implications: they can overestimate the protection for certain subgroups, in particular for the most
sensitive individuals. Models that are considered privacy-preserving might not only oer worse
results to minorities [4] but also leave their privacy unprotected.
Broader Impact
The study of privacy of ML models is essential to ensure they can be safely employed to critical
applications and data (e.g., diagnosis and prognosis, census data); this entails a complete under-
standing of several aspects of the problem, pertaining to how data is collected, where it is processed,
and what information the model itself reveals once deployed. In this context, our work extends on
our knowledge (as a community) about the leakage of the ML model outputs in the context of MIA.
One of the possible societal impacts of our work is to encourage further regulations concerning
the application of ML in critical settings. In particular, we show that it is not sucient to measure
privacy on average: doing so can discriminate certain subgroups. Veale et al. have argued that
vulnerability of models to MIA can qualify them as private data under data protection law [29].
The fact that attacks can be more eective against under-represented individuals might change the
conditions under which a model is deemed private. We further give tools to systematically analyze
the actual vulnerability of ML models in this context.
This line of research has an unfortunate potential consequence: it uncovers new attack strategies
that can be misused by malicious entities. Our work in particular is unable to show any denite
solution against disparate vulnerability; conversely, it shows that standard defenses can fail. Never-
theless, the eld of security has for long acknowledged that it is equally important to expose attacks
as it is to design defenses. Indeed, if no defense could be designed for preventing an attack against a
system, the knowledge of this fact would enable us to limit the system’s use in critical applications.
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Table 1: Summary of the datasets, together with the name of the attribute used to dene the
subgroups, and the name of each subgroup.
Dataset Details Subgroup Attribute Subgroups
ADULT 48,842 examples, 14 features,
binary classication
Race White (WH), Black (BL),
Asian-Pac-Islander (AI),
Amer-Indian-Eskimo
(AE), Other (OT)
COMPAS 6,172 examples, 15 features,
binary classication
Race African-American (AA),
Caucasian (CA), Hispanic
(HI), Native American
(NA), Other (OT)
UTKFace 23,705 face images, |Y| = 6 Ethnicity White, Asian, Indian,
Black, Other
A Experiment details
A.1 Vulnerability Estimation
Because we dene vulnerability as the accuracy of Bayes adversaries, it is not possible to compute ∆Vz,z′ = |Vz − Vz′ |
exactly. Instead, we estimate the vulnerability of a classier f , trained on a dataset S, against estimates of our adversaries
(Equation (2)) as follows. We construct an evaluation set E which contains an equal number of “in” samples S, and
“out” samples S¯ from Ω \ S, i.e., such that Pr[M(X,Y ) = 0 | (X,Y ) ∈ E] = 1/2, which satises Assumption 1.
To satisfy Assumption 2, when sampling S and S¯ examples we stratify them by values of (y, z), i.e., ensuring that
Pr[Y, Z |M = 1] = Pr[Y, Z |M = 0].
We produce the condence outputs observed by an adversary by querying the classier with all the examples (x, y) ∈ E,
and obtaining yˆ = f(x), which we discretize into 10 uniformly spaced bins. Then we approximate the probability
distributions for the regular and discriminating adversaries, respectively Pr[M | Y, Yˆ ] and Pr[M | Y, Yˆ , Z], by counting
the relative frequencies of condence outputs yˆ. Based on these distributions, we estimate the success of each adversary
(Equation (2)) as their average accuracy on the same set E.
In our experiments, for each model and each dataset we construct 35 random training/test shues, meaning 35 dierent
sets E.
A.2 Details on Datasets and Pre-processing
ADULT or Census Income [17]. Contains 48,842 examples from the 1994 Census database1. The prediction task is to
determine if a yearly salary is over/under $50K. It contains attributes such as age, sex education, race, native-country, etc.
After one-hot-encoding all such features, the dataset contains 91 features. We use “race” as the subgroup attribute z, dening
the following groups: White (WH), Black (BL), Asian-Pac-Islander (AI), Amer-Indian-Eskimo (AE), and Other (OT).
COMPAS [15]. Contains data from the ProPublica’s investigation, concerning arrests in Florida and information on new
crimes over the next two years. It also includes COMPAS recidivism risk scores, which we do not use. We follow ProPublica’s
pre-processing strategy: we drop examples with missing entries for charge degree and recidivism status, and those with a
charge date later than 30 days from the arrest. We use the 2-year-recidivist feature as the target label y. After one-hot-coding,
the dataset contains 6,172 examples and 15 features. We use “race” as the subgroup z, which has the following categories:
African-American (AA), Caucasian (CA), Hispanic (HI), Native American (NA), and Other (OT).
UTKFace [31]. Contains over 20,000 face images labeled by the age of the person, and annotated with “ethnicity”.
We use the ethnicity attribute as the subgroup attribute z, taking values: White, Asian, Indian, Black, and Other. The
classication task is age estimation where age is an integer from 1 to 106. We discretize the age attribute into 6 bins: 0–16,
17–25, 26–40, 41–55, 56–65, and above 65. We use this new 6-class categorical feature as our y labels for age estimation.
Table 1 presents a summary of the relevant characteristics of our datasets.
Inclusion of the sensitive attribute for training. We assume both target and attacker classiers are well aware of the
sensitive attribute. This is because, in most cases, explicit removal of the sensitive attribute is either undesirable or not
entirely possible due to the existence of proxy features. Therefore, the training datasets for both ADULT and COMPAS,
explicitly include the sensitive attribute.
1https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
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Table 2: Model hyper-parameters
Model Hyper-parameters
LR C = 0.01, l2 penalty, solver = “lbfgs”
NN-6 α = 0.01, solver = “adam”
NN-100 solver = “adam”, 200 epochs
NN-500 solver = “adam”, 200 epochs
Table 3: UTKFace model architecture
Layer Output Shape # Parameters
Conv2D (32, 32, 64) 832
MaxPooling2D (16, 16, 64) 0
Dropout (16, 16, 64) 0
Conv2D (16, 16, 32) 8224
MaxPooling2D (8, 8, 32) 0
Dropout (8, 8, 32) 0
Flatten (2048, ) 0
Dense (256, ) 524544
Dropout (256, ) 0
Dense (6, ) 1542
A.3 Model Details
For all models other the convolutional neural net for UTKFace, we use scikit-learn [24]. Table 2 details the hyper-parameters
used for each model type.
For the UTKFace model, we use keras [1]. Table 3 details the architecture of the model. We train it using the Adam
optimizer with batch size of 64 for 100 epochs. For the non-overtting version, we keep the best model in terms of validation
loss across the 100 epochs, where the validation set is a randomly chosen subset of the training set with 2000 examples.
A.4 Statistical Testing for Disparate Vulnerability
Outline. We t a linear mixed-eects model (LMM) to model vulnerability with the subgroup as a xed eect, and example-
and shue-level crossed random eects [12]. Using this model, we conduct an ANOVA test to identify whether any two
subgroups have dierent mean vulnerability. If the test is conclusive at the level α = 0.005, we conduct follow-up tests
using the estimated marginal means method [27] to identify which particular subgroup pairs exhibit disparity, at level
α = 0.005 with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple testing.
LMM specication. Let i be an index of an example from a dataset, j be the index of a shue (corresponding to one
evaluation dataset E), and si be the one-hot encoded subgroup of the example i. Consider a Bernoulli random variable Vij
showing whether the adversary succeeded in inferring membership of the example i against the model trained on shue j.
We have two types of dependencies among all {Vij}: within-shue measurements are dependent because they all relate to
the same target model, and between-shue measurements are dependent because same examples appear in all shues. We
thus use the following LMM to model Vij :
Vij = β · si + µ+ αi + αj + εij ,
where β is a global vector of coecients corresponding to the xed eects of the subgroup, µ is the global intercept, αi is
the random intercept of the example i, αj is the random intercept of the shue j, and εij is the independent noise term.
We choose the linear model as opposed to a mixed-eect logistic regression as we are only interested in average eects.
Software. We use R lme4 [5] package to t the LMM, lmerTest [18] package to conduct the ANOVA tests, and emmeans [19]
package to conduct pairwise comparisons.
B Proofs
In this section we provide the proofs of the formal statements made in the main paper. For clarity, we use in and out to
mean outcomes 1 and 0 of the random variable M . In a slight abuse of notation we also use in and out to denote events
M = 1 and M = 0 as a shorthand.
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B.1 Regular vs. Discriminating Vulnerability
Proposition 1. V D ≥ V R.
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that the Bayes adversary uses a Bayes-optimal classier that maximizes the success probability
(i.e., vulnerability) among all the possible classiers. That is, for the regular and discriminating adversaries, we have
respectively:
V R = max
g:Y×Yˆ 7→{0,1}
Pr[g(Y, Yˆ ) = M ]
V D = max
g:Y×Yˆ×Z7→{0,1}
Pr[g(Y, Yˆ , Z) = M ] .
Let F = {f | f = g ◦ h, h(y, yˆ, z) = (y, yˆ), g : Y × Yˆ 7→ {0, 1}}; that is, F is the set of functions f :
Y × Yˆ × Z 7→ {0, 1} that rst reduce the vector (y, yˆ, z) to (y, yˆ) and then apply a function g to the remaining input.
Clearly, F ⊂ {g | g : Y× Yˆ× Z 7→ {0, 1}}.
Then, to prove this proposition it suces to observe that the regular adversary is equivalent to a discriminating one
restricted to the set of functions F .
V D = max
g:Y×Yˆ×Z7→{0,1}
Pr[g(Y, Yˆ , Z) = M ]
≥ max
f∈F
Pr[f(Y, Yˆ , Z) = M ]
= max
g:Y×Yˆ7→{0,1}
Pr[g(Y, Yˆ ) = M ]
= V R .
B.2 Vulnerability and Distributional Overtting (Section 5)
B.2.1 Overall Vulnerability
In this section, we prove Theorem 1, which establishes a connection of total variation between model in/out output
distributions and overall vulnerability.
In order to make this and further proofs simpler, we rst prove a series of simpler statements, and introduce some
helper notions. For convenience, let us dene the following additive components of the total variation between in and out
output distributions:
Denition 9. We dene model-output gaps as follows:
γ(yˆ, y) , Pr[yˆ | y, in]− Pr[yˆ | y, out]
γz(yˆ, y) , Pr[yˆ | y, z, in]− Pr[yˆ | y, z, out] .
Note that τ(y) = 1
2
∑
yˆ |γ(yˆ, y)| and τz(y) = 12
∑
yˆ |γz(yˆ, y)| (see Figure 5).
Suppose an adversary makes a prediction mˆ for the membership m of an example. We measure their gain as the
negative 0-1 loss:
Denition 10.
v(mˆ,m) , 1[mˆ = m] . (4)
Using the model-output gaps we can reformulate the adversary’s gain:
Proposition 4. LetA(yˆ, y) be the regular adversary. Then,
v(A(yˆ, y), in) = 1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0]
v(A(yˆ, y), out) = 1[γ(yˆ, y) ≤ 0] .
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that we dene v as the negative zero-one loss. Hence,
v(A(yˆ, y), in) = 1[A(yˆ, y) = in]
= 1[ arg max
m′∈{in,out}
Pr[m′ | yˆ, y] = in]
= 1[Pr[in | yˆ, y] > Pr[out | yˆ, y]] .
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As the prior Pr[M ] = 1/2 is uniform, a max-aposteriori decision is equivalent to the max-likelihood decision:
1[Pr[in | yˆ, y] > Pr[out | yˆ, y]]
=1[Pr[yˆ, y | in] > Pr[yˆ, y | out]]
=1[Pr[yˆ, y | in]− Pr[yˆ, y | out] > 0] .
By Y⊥M assumption (consequence of Assumption 2), the last form is equivalent to:
1[Pr[yˆ | y, in]− Pr[yˆ | y, out] > 0] = 1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] .
v(A(yˆ, y), out) can be obtained as 1− v(A(yˆ, y), in).
A similar result holds for the discriminating adversary:
Proposition 5. LetAD(yˆ, y, z) be the discriminating adversary. Then,
v(AD(yˆ, y, z), in) = 1[γz(yˆ, y) > 0]
v(AD(yˆ, y, z), out) = 1[γz(yˆ, y) ≤ 0] .
Proof of Proposition 5.
v(AD(yˆ, y, z), in) = 1[A(yˆ, y, z) = in]
= 1[ arg max
m′∈{in,out}
Pr[m′ | yˆ, y, z] = in]
= 1[Pr[in | yˆ, y, z] > Pr[out | yˆ, y, z]] .
As before, because the prior Pr[M ] = 1/2 is uniform, a max-aposteriori decision is equivalent to the max-likelihood decision:
1[Pr[in | yˆ, y, z] > Pr[out | yˆ, y, z]]
=1[Pr[yˆ, y, z | in] > Pr[yˆ, y, z | out]] .
By Z⊥M assumption (consequence of Assumption 2):
1[Pr[yˆ, y, z | in] > Pr[yˆ, y, z | out]]
=1[Pr[yˆ, y | z, in] > Pr[yˆ, y | z, out]]
=1[Pr[yˆ, y | z, in]− Pr[yˆ, y | z, out] > 0] .
Observe that by (Y, Z)⊥M (Assumption 2),
Pr[Y | Z,M ] = Pr[Y, Z,M ]
Pr[Z,M ]
=
Pr[Y, Z] Pr[M ]
Pr[Z] Pr[M ]
= Pr[Y | Z] .
Hence the expression is equivalent to:
1[Pr[yˆ | y, z, in]− Pr[yˆ | y, z, out] > 0] = 1[γz(yˆ, y) > 0].
Proposition 6. The distributional-overtting distances have the following equivalent forms:
τ(y) =
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] γ(yˆ, y)
τz(y) =
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γz(yˆ, y) > 0] γz(yˆ, y) .
(5)
Proof of Proposition 6. Observe that τ(y) and τz(y) by denitions (see Figure 5) equal to the following:
τ(y) =
1
2
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
|γ(yˆ, y)| = 1
2
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
[1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] γ(yˆ, y)− 1[γ(yˆ, y) ≤ 0] γ(yˆ, y)]
τz(y) =
1
2
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
|γz(yˆ, y)| = 1
2
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
[1[γz(yˆ, y) > 0] γz(yˆ, y)− 1[γz(yˆ, y) ≤ 0] γz(yˆ, y)] .
Using simple algebraic manipulations, we can obtain the following form:
τ(y) =
1
2
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
[1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] γ(yˆ, y)− 1[γ(yˆ, y) ≤ 0] γ(yˆ, y)]
=
1
2
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
[1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] γ(yˆ, y)− (1− 1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0]) γ(yˆ, y)]
=
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
[
1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] γ(yˆ, y)− 1
2
γ(yˆ, y)
]
,
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and analogously:
τz(y) =
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
[
1[γz(yˆ, y) > 0] γz(yˆ, y)− 1
2
γz(yˆ, y)
]
.
Then, noting the following property of the output gaps:∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
γ(yˆ, y) =
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
Pr[yˆ | y, in]−
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
Pr[yˆ | y, out] = 0
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
γz(yˆ, y) =
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
Pr[yˆ | y, z, in]−
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
Pr[yˆ | y, z, out] = 0,
we obtain the forms in Equation (5).
Finally, we can prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. By the law of total expectation we have:
V R = E[v(A(Yˆ , Y ),M)]
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y), in) Pr[yˆ, y | in]
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y), out) Pr[yˆ, y | out] .
Because v(·, in) = 1− v(·, out), this is equal to:
V R =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y), in)(Pr[yˆ, y | in]− Pr[yˆ, y | out]) .
By Y⊥M assumption (consequence of Assumption 2), we have that Pr[Yˆ , Y |M ] = Pr[Yˆ | Y,M ] Pr[Y ].
Using this fact and Proposition 4 we have:
V R =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
Pr[y]
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] γ(yˆ, y) .
From Proposition 6 we immediately obtain the sought expression for the regular adversary:
V R =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
Pr[y]τ(y) .
Analogously, for the discriminating adversary we have:
V D = E[v(A(Yˆ , Y, Z),M)]
=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y, z), in) Pr[yˆ, y, z | in]
+
1
2
∑
z∈Z
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y, z), out) Pr[yˆ, y, z | out]
=
1
2
+
1
2
∑
z∈Z
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y, z, in)(Pr[yˆ, y, z | in]− Pr[yˆ, y, z | out]) .
By (Y, Z)⊥M assumption (Assumption 2) we have that Pr[Yˆ , Y, Z |M ] = Pr[Yˆ | Y, Z,M ] Pr[Y, Z].
Using this fact and Proposition 5 we obtain:
V D =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
z∈Z
∑
y∈Y
Pr[y, z]
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γz(yˆ, y) > 0] γz(yˆ, y)
=
1
2
+
1
2
∑
z∈Z
∑
y∈Y
Pr[z]ρz(y)
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γz(yˆ, y) > 0] γz(yˆ, y) .
Finally, from Proposition 6 we immediately obtain the sought expression for the discriminating adversary:
V D =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
z∈Z
∑
y∈Y
Pr[z] ρz(y) τz(y) .
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B.2.2 Subgroup Vulnerability
Previously, we showed how overall vulnerability relates to total variation. In this section, we show how subgroup vulnerability
relates to total variation between in and out output distributions on subgroups. We use these forms to show the necessary
and sucient conditions for the absence of disparate vulnerability (see Theorem 5).
Lemma 1. The subgroup vulnerability to the discriminating adversary can be expressed as follows:
V Dz =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
ρz(y) τz(y) . (6)
Proof of Lemma 1. By the law of total expectation:
V Dz = E[v(A(Yˆ , Y, z),M) | z]
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
y∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y, z), in) Pr[yˆ, y | z, in]
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
y∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y, z), out) Pr[yˆ, y | z, out] .
Because v(·, in) = 1− v(·, out), this is equal to:
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
y∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y, z), in)(Pr[yˆ, y | z, in]− Pr[yˆ, y | z, out]) .
As previously, by (Y, Z)⊥M (Assumption 2), we have that Pr[Yˆ , Y | Z,M ] = Pr[Yˆ | Y, Z,M ] Pr[Y |Z]. Using this and
applying Proposition 5 we get:
V Dz =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
[
ρz(y)
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γz(yˆ, y) > 0] γz(yˆ, y)
]
. (7)
By Proposition 6 this is equal to the sought form.
The analogous form for the subgroup vulnerability to the regular vulnerability is dierent:
Lemma 2. The subgroup vulnerability to the regular adversary can be expressed as follows:
V Rz =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
[
ρz(y)
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] γz(yˆ, y)
]
. (8)
Proof of Lemma 2. By the law of total expectation we have:
V Rz = E[v(A(Yˆ , Y ),M) | z]
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y), in) Pr[yˆ, y | z, in]
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y), out) Pr[yˆ, y | z, out] .
Because v(·, in) = 1− v(·, out), this is equal to:
1
2
+
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
v(A(yˆ, y), in)(Pr[yˆ, y | z, in]− Pr[yˆ, y | z, out]) .
By (Y, Z)⊥M (Assumption 2), we have that Pr[Yˆ , Y | Z,M ] = Pr[Yˆ | Y, Z,M ] Pr[Y |Z]. Using this and applying
Proposition 4 we obtain the sought form.
Note the dierence in the vulnerability-gain expression (uses γ) and probability dierence part (uses γz ). This is because
we are conditioning a regular adversary (hence the gain expression uses γ) on a subgroup z (hence the probabilities are
conditioned on z through γz ). In the case of discriminating adversary, both parts use γz , which simplies the expression.
B.2.3 Disparate Vulnerability
In this section, we (re)state the necessary and sucient conditions for the absence of disparate vulnerability (see Theo-
rem 5). Having the equivalent subgroup vulnerability forms from Lemmas 1 and 2 in the previous section, the proofs are
straightforward.
Theorem 2. LetGz andGz′ be two subgroups of the population Ω. There is no disparate vulnerability for a discriminating
adversary between the two subgroups (i.e., ∆V D
z,z′ = 0) i:∑
y∈Y
(
ρz(y) τz(y)− ρz′ (y) τz′ (y)
)
= 0 .
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Proof of Theorem 2. Follows directly from Lemma 1 as ∆V D
z,z′ = |V Dz − V Dz′ |.
Theorem 3. Let Gz and Gz′ be two subgroups of the population Ω. There is no disparate vulnerability for a regular
adversary between the two subgroups (i.e., ∆V D
z,z′ = 0) i:∑
y∈Y,yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0]
(
ρz(y) γz(yˆ, y)− ρz′ (y) γz′ (yˆ, y)
)
= 0 . (9)
Proof of Theorem 3. Analogously, follows directly from Lemma 2 as ∆V R
z,z′ = |V Rz − V Rz′ |.
B.3 Disparate Vulnerability and Equality of Odds (Section 6.2)
In this section, we prove the statements concerning connections of disparate vulnerability and the GEO property.
Proposition 2. Suppose a classier satises GEO. Then, V Rz = V Dz for any subgroup z.
Proof of Proposition 2. By the theorem statement, for anym, yˆ, y, the value p , Pr[yˆ | y, z,m] is equal across all subgroups
z ∈ Z. This implies that for any z:
Pr[yˆ | y,m] =
∑
z∈Z
Pr[z | y,m] Pr[yˆ | y, z,m] = p
∑
z∈Z
Pr[z | y,m] = p = Pr[yˆ | y, z,m] .
Therefore, γ(yˆ, y) = γz(yˆ, y). Recalling equations 8 and 7, this implies V Rz = V Dz .
Proposition 3. Suppose a classier satises GEO, and ρz(y) = ρz′ (y) holds for any y and for all z, z′. Then, ∆V Rz,z′ = 0
and ∆V D
z,z′ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix yˆ, y. Let pin , Pr[yˆ | y, in]. Dene pout analogously.
A model-output gap γ can be expressed as follows: γ(yˆ, y) = pin − pout, and it is equal for all subgroups z.
As mentioned in the proof of Proposition 2, GEO implies γ(yˆ, y) = γz(yˆ, y). Hence, the necessary and sucient
condition for the absence of disparate vulnerability w.r.t groups z, z′ against both attackers becomes:
0 =
∑
y∈Y,yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0]
(
ρz(y) γ(yˆ, y)− ρz′ (y) γ(yˆ, y)
)
=
∑
y∈Y,yˆ∈Yˆ
1[γ(yˆ, y) > 0] γ(yˆ, y)
(
ρz(y)− ρz′ (y)
)
.
(10)
Because ρz(y) = ρz′ (y) for every y and pair z, z′ by the theorem statement, every term in the summation is zero.
This implies no disparate vulnerability against both adversaries.
C Additional Figures and Tables
This section contains additional gures and tables for our experiments.
White: 11672
(86%)
Black: 1268
(9%)
Asian-Pac-Islander: 391
(3%)
Amer-Indian-Eskimo: 130
(1%)
Other: 106
(1%)
S
ub
gr
ou
ps
100-Neuron NN
Discriminating
Regular
500-Neuron NN
50 60
Vulnerability
Overall
50 60
Vulnerability
(a) ADULT
African-American: 952
(51%)
Caucasian: 630
(34%)
Hispanic: 152
(8%)
Other: 104
(6%)
S
ub
gr
ou
ps
100-Neuron NN 500-Neuron NN
50 60
Vulnerability
Overall
50 60
Vulnerability
(b) COMPAS
White: 10078
(43%)
Black: 4526
(19%)
Indian: 3975
(17%)
Asian: 3434
(14%)
Other: 1692
(7%)
S
ub
gr
ou
ps
DNN (Overfitting)
0.55 0.60
Vulnerability
Overall
(c) UTKFace
Figure 7: Eect of overtting on subgroup vulnerability. See Figure 2 for context.
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Table 4: Vulnerability and maximum vulnerability disparity of dierent models. The columns are test
accuracy, overtting, vulnerability, and maximum pairwise vulnerability disparity (max-disparity),
with their mean and standard deviation (std) values over N = 35 training/test set shues on each
dataset. Numbers are percentage points. Negative overtting is an artifact due to a large number of
duplicate feature vectors.
(a) COMPAS
Regular Discriminating
Test Acc. Overtting Max-Disparity Vulnerability Max-Disparity Vulnerability
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
Logistic Regression (LR) 68.15 2.42 0.73 2.00 18.61 8.39 52.09 0.87 29.03 6.84 60.10 10.83
6-Neuron NN 68.75 3.12 1.81 3.22 15.93 8.19 51.72 0.50 30.50 6.71 60.70 11.42
100-Neuron NN 67.61 4.58 8.22 11.21 18.25 10.51 53.77 2.37 32.40 8.84 61.72 12.16
500-Neuron NN 67.29 4.24 9.27 10.60 16.65 10.35 54.95 4.03 35.02 7.78 62.36 12.78
DP LR, ε = 1 59.41 5.15 -0.34 0.85 9.66 5.54 51.78 0.39 12.01 9.74 55.23 2.27
DP LR, ε = 2.5 60.65 4.99 -0.26 0.66 7.12 2.41 51.46 0.70 7.74 4.76 54.66 1.55
DP LR, ε = 5 64.99 4.94 0.12 0.91 11.30 6.56 51.51 0.63 19.44 8.63 57.23 5.37
DP LR, ε = 7.5 66.50 3.19 -0.79 1.59 14.99 7.49 51.48 0.77 22.19 8.31 58.23 7.34
Fair LR (Equalized Odds) 64.10 1.47 1.88 2.17 13.63 7.43 53.44 3.64 16.91 6.05 55.37 6.07
(b) ADULT
Regular Discriminating
Test Acc. Overtting Max-Disparity Vulnerability Max-Disparity Vulnerability
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
Logistic Regression (LR) 87.22 3.93 0.49 0.55 3.27 1.32 50.55 0.10 5.07 0.86 52.83 2.05
6-Neuron NN 87.23 3.86 0.87 0.76 3.22 1.39 50.73 0.23 5.04 1.23 52.82 2.01
100-Neuron NN 85.98 4.05 7.13 4.83 6.12 0.83 53.92 2.40 7.31 0.76 54.83 3.05
500-Neuron NN 85.40 3.95 9.95 5.03 7.01 0.67 55.44 2.63 8.45 0.86 56.20 3.25
DP LR, ε = 1 77.07 6.59 -0.14 0.35 2.37 1.51 50.41 0.25 4.27 1.65 51.89 1.04
DP LR, ε = 2.5 76.10 7.47 0.21 0.44 2.17 1.38 50.33 0.18 3.65 1.15 51.65 0.95
DP LR, ε = 5 84.27 5.27 0.29 0.36 3.14 1.73 50.50 0.25 5.06 1.38 52.61 1.73
DP LR, ε = 7.5 85.33 4.69 0.37 0.45 2.75 1.12 50.47 0.25 4.88 1.16 52.68 1.87
Fair LR (Equalized Odds) 85.43 2.64 0.79 0.65 2.30 1.07 50.79 0.56 2.90 0.93 51.26 1.03
(c) UTKFace
Regular Discriminating
Test Acc. Overtting Max-Disparity Vulnerability Max-Disparity Vulnerability
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
DNN (Non-Overtting) 57.18 4.89 3.13 0.80 0.83 0.34 55.54 0.06 1.21 0.44 55.99 0.34
DNN (Overtting) 55.93 4.62 24.47 2.92 2.78 0.87 56.22 0.80 3.06 0.92 56.68 0.98
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Figure 8: Eect of overtting on disparate vulnerability (regular adversary.) See Figure 1 for context.
19
A
A
C
A H
I
O
T
A
S
N
A
AA
CA
HI
OT
AS
NA
0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0
ε = 1
A
A
C
A H
I
O
T
A
S
N
A
0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0
ε = 2.5
A
A
C
A H
I
O
T
A
S
N
A
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 0
1 0
0
ε = 5
A
A
C
A H
I
O
T
A
S
N
A
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1
1 1
0
ε = 7.5
Figure 9: Statistical evidence of disparate vulnerability of ε-DP LR models trained on COMPAS
(discriminating addversary.)
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Figure 10: Statistical evidence of disparate vulnerability of ε-DP LR models trained on ADULT
(discriminating adversary.)
AA CA HI OT AS NA
A
A
C
A
H
I
O
T
A
S
N
A
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0
0
Fair LR (Equalized Odds)
(a) Regular
AA CA HI OT AS NA
A
A
C
A
H
I
O
T
A
S
N
A
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1
1 1
0
Fair LR (Equalized Odds)
(b) Discriminating
Figure 11: Eect of EO on disparate vulnerability on COMPAS
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Figure 12: The eect of subgroup distribution. Data for the all subgroups are gradually increased,
and subgroup and overall vulnerability are measured against the regular (left) and discriminating
(right) attackers. See Figure 4 (left) for context.
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Figure 13: The eect of data volume. Data for the ‘target’ subgroup is gradually increased and
subgroup vulnerability is measured for all subgroups, against the regular (left) and discriminating
(right) attackers. See Figure 4 (right) for context.
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